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WHERE SHOULD WE DRAw THE LINE?:
SOUTH CAROLINA'S
BATTLE WITH RAcIAL GERRYMANDERING
I. INTRODUCTION

In Smith v. Beasley' the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina considered the constitutionality of three South Carolina Senate
and nine House of Representatives election districts. Ultimately, the court
held that six of the house districts2 and three senate districts3 were unconstitutional because they violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 4 Using a standard of strict
scrutiny, the court found that legislators had considered race as the predominant factor in their redistricting plans and that the districts were not narrowly
tailored to accomplish the State's asserted interest of complying with sections
2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 5 In sum, the court found evidence of
racially gerrymandering and rejected the redistricting plans as unconstitution6
al.
This article briefly describes the history of racial gerrymandering and how
the Beasley decision is consistent with recent Supreme Court cases. Later
sections will examine and question the propriety of judicial intervention into
legislative redistricting plans. The analysis will end with a suggested solution
to the Beasley dilemma-a system that would forego any need for judicial
intermeddling.
II. BACKGROUND

The term "gerrymander" was coined over 180 years ago to describe a
Massachusetts voting district sinuously shaped liked a salamander and so
drawn to benefit Governor Elbridge Gerry's political party.' As such, racial

1. No. 3:95-3235-0, 1996 WL 673301 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 1996) (to be reported at 946 F.
Supp. 1174). Beasley was a consolidated case that also included Able v. Wilkins, No. 3:96-00030.
2. Districts 12, 54, 82, 91, 103 and 121. See id. at *42.
3. Districts 29, 34 and 37. See id.
4. See id. at *43.
5. See id.
6. See id. at *42.
7. See N. Jay Shepherd, Note, "Abridge" Too Far:Racial Gerrymandering, the Fifteenth
Amendment, and Shaw v. Reno, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 337, 342 (1994); see also Ion M.
Anderson, Comment, Politicsand Purpose:Hide and Seek in the GerrymanderingThicket after
Davis v. Bandemer, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 183, 183 (1987).
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gerrymandering is the "deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries
. for [racial] purposes."8 Gerrymandering involves the differential
treatment of similarly situated people (for the purposes of drawing voting
districts); therefore, it implicates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and requires strict scrutiny.9
"Gerrymandering violates the American constitutional tradition by
conceding to legislatures the power of self-selection."' 10 Attempting to gain
power by mechanical manipulation of the districts instead of appealing to
voters is obviously wrong." Yet, gerrymanderers make no attempt to appeal
rationally to the public interest and common welfare. "[I]ndeed, their purpose
is to eliminate the need for any such appeal." 2
In Reynolds v. Sims 3 the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause requires legislative districts to consist of substantially equal populations.' 4 As a result, states are required to redraw district lines every ten
years to take into account population shifts.' 5 Combining precise federal
census data 6 with high-tech computer equipment, 7 legislators can manipu-

8. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640 (1993) (alteration in original) (quoting Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 (1986)) [hereinafter Shawl]; see also Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F.
Supp. 1188, 1194 (W.D. La. 1993), vacated on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994) (holding
that a legislature is guilty of racial gerrymandering when it "intentionally draws one or more
districts along racial lines or otherwise intentionally segregates citizens into voting districts based
on their race.").
9. See Shaw 1,509 U.S. at 653. Strict scrutiny is also the standard of review for cases
involving "benign" racial classifications. See id. A racial classification is benign if it seeks to
help minorities remedy past discrimination by ensuring the election of minority officials in near
proportion to the minority population. See Jeffery G. Hamilton, Comment, Deeper Into the
PoliticalThicket: Racial and PoliticalGerrymanderingand the Supreme Court, 43 EMORY L.J.
1519, 1555 (1994).
10. Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion:Compactnessas a Procedural
SafeguardAgainstPartisanGerrymandering,9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 301, 304 (1991). "Selfconstitutive . . . legislatures make no sense under [the] Constitution," which mandates a
dispersion of power. Id.
11. See id. at 314.
12. Id.
13. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
14. See id. at 559-61. Of course, the rule of equal populations was first developed in the
context of apportionment for the Federal House of Representatives. Expansion of the concept has
been a matter of course rooted in the constitutional ideal that "one man's vote in a congressional
election is to be worth as much as another's." Id. at 559.
15. "Every ten-years, the job of the legislature is to make changes in the representation plan
that reflect the political makeup of the state as shown by the census." Beasley, 1996 WL 673301,
at *12; see U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 1, cI. 3; Polsby & Popper, supra note 10, at 301.
16. "Data from the U.S. Census Bureau is now readily accessible by computer. The Bureau's
Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER) System gives census
information on a street-by-street format allowing districting authorities to include or exclude
people in fantastic detail." Shepherd, supra note 7, at 344 (footnotes omitted); see also DAvID
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late data to a politicians' specifications and almost guarantee the results of an
election.' 8
In 1965 Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act' 9 for "the broad
purpose of remedying racial voting discrimination that had been practiced
principally in southern states."2' It is argued that sections 2 and 5 of the
Voting Rights Act essentially "mandate that majority-minority districts be
created whenever possible."21 Section 2 provides a cause of action for
minority vote dilution, and section 5 prohibits retrogression.' Section 5 also
requires a state to obtain preclearance from the United States Attorney
General' or to obtain a judgment from the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia declaring that a proposed change "does not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote
on account of race or color. "24
Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 19 8 2 s to guarantee
minorities the right to a meaningful vote and to give litigants broad authority
"to challenge the inequalities in the political process." 2 6 However, "[tjhe
tragedy of this new voting rights jurisprudence is that it has only served to
polarize the races, doing little to substantively advance the interests of
Because racial gerrymandering segregates minorities
minority voters. "2
into their own electoral districts,28 politicians no longer need to broadly

BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL

PERSPECTIVES 60-61 (1992).

17. The South Carolina Senate and House of Representatives used sophisticated computer
equipment and "software that showed precincts, streets, population, and racial composition of all
areas based on the 1990 federal census data base." Beasley, 1996 WL 673301, at *10.
18. Hamilton, supra note 11, at 1544.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
20. David F. Walbert, Georgia'sExperience with the Voting Rights Act: Past,Present, and
Future, 44 EMORY L.J. 979, 979 (1995).
21. Hamilton, supra note 11, at 1556. A majority-minority district is a voting district that is
composed of a majority of a particular racial minority group.
22. See id. at 1556 n.217. If it is possible for a state to create a majority-minority district,
then it must do so to avoid a vote dilution claim. See id. Retrogression occurs when a state
decreases the number of majority-minority districts it had previously created. See id.
23. See id. at 1556 n.220. The Attorney General determines whether or not the plan has
enough majority-minority districts, and if not, the AG will deny preclearance. See id. at 1556.
24. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 634.
25. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)).
26. Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory ofBlack
Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1095 (1991).
27. Hamilton, supra note 11, at 1548.
28. See id. at 1549.
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appeal29 to people of all races. They need appeal only to members of their own
race.
Although racial gerrymandering ensures more black representation, black
electoral success may not necessarily result in a government more responsive
to their interests.3 0 "Minority empowerment requires minority legislative
influence, not just minority legislative presence. ""3 White representatives are
now elected from homogeneous white districts, and that allows whites to
ignore minority interests without the fear of adverse electoral consequences. 2
Instead of sinply ensuring that black officeholders are elected from black
districts, attention to minority interests might actually be better advanced "by
increasing the number of officeholders, black or white, who have to appeal to
blacks to win." 33 "When politicians of all races realize that they must appeal
to voters of all races in order to win an election, only then will they effectively
address minority concerns." 34
The United States Supreme Court first dealt with racial gerrymandering
in 1960 in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.35 The Court struck down an Alabama law
that excluded African-Americans from local elections by redrawing the city's
boundaries as a "strangely irregular twenty-eight-sided figure. "36 Because the
Alabama law singled out a racial minority for invidious treatment, the
Supreme Court held the law unconstitutional. 7 Over thirty years later in
Shaw v. Reno (Shaw 1),38 the Supreme Court "expanded its prohibition of
racial gerrymandering to restrict 'affirmative gerrymandering' aimed at
increasing the power of ethnic minorities." 9
In Shaw I the Supreme Court stated that racial gerrymandering, even
when used for remedial purposes, "may balkanize us into competing racial
factions [and] threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system
in which race no longer matters." 40 Therefore, the Court created a new way
to establish a prima facie case "under the Equal Protection Clause, recognizing
geographical oddities in legislative redistricting plans as sufficient evidence of
intentional discrimination to prove an equal protection violation. ""4
29. See id.

30. See id.
31. Guinier, supra note 26, at 1102.
32. See id. at 1126.
33. See id. at 1127 (quoting ABIGAIL THERNsTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?.: AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 21 (1987)).
34. Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1552.
35. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
36. Michael E. Lewyn, How to Limit Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REv. 403, 412 (1993).
37. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346.

38. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
39. See Lewyn, supra note 36, at 413.
40. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 657.
41. Aim6e D. Latimer, Note, Miller v. Johnson: The Supreme Court Eases the Burden of
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To make out an equal protection claim of racial gerrymandering, a
plaintiff need merely show that the "reapportionment scheme [is] so irrational
on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into
separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks
sufficient justification."4 A state can, however, defeat a claim that a district
has been racially gerrymandered by showing that it adhered to traditional
districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political
subdivisions.'
In Miller v. Johnson4 the Supreme Court affirmed the Shaw I holding
that adherence to traditional districting principles may suffice to refute a claim
of racial gerrymandering; however, the Miller Court added that a state cannot
make such a refutation when compactness, contiguity, and respect for political
subdivisions are subordinated to racial objectives. 45 The Miller Court further
eased the plaintiffs' burden by freeing them of any requirement to submit
evidence "regarding the district's geometry and makeup [and by not requiring
plaintiffs] to make a threshold showing of bizarreness."46 Thus, after Miller
a plaintiff must show only that "race was the predominant factor motivating
the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or
without a particular district."4'
If a plaintiff can prove that race was in fact the predominant factor in
creating a redistricting plan, then the burden shifts to the State to satisfy strict
scrutiny.4" That is, the State must demonstrate that its districting legislation
is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.49 The Miller Court held
that a state's redistricting plan created to comply with federal antidiscrimination laws could withstand strict scrutiny, but only when the racially
gerrymandered districts were reasonably necessary to satisfy the requirements
of the federal laws.5 0 Although courts normally defer to the Justice Department's interpretation of federal laws, the Miller Court stated that "blind
judicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncements... has no place
in equal protection analysis.""'
ProvingRacial Gerrymandering, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 97, 115 (1995).
42. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 658.
43. See id. at 647.

44. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
45. See id. at 2489.
46. See id. at 2488.
47. Id.
48. See Beasley, 1996 WL 673301, at *37. Strict scrutiny requires the State to prove that its
actions are in pursuit of a compelling interest and that its means chosen are necessary to achieve
that compelling interest. See Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1902 (1996) [hereinafter Shawll].
49. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490; see also Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1951 (1996);
Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1898; Shawl, 509 U.S. at 643.
50. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491; see also Latimer, supra note 41, at 123.
51. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
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Most recently, in Bush v. Vera 2 and Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw JJ),53 the
Supreme announced again that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of inquiry
when examining redistricting legislation that subordinates traditional raceneutral districting principles to clear racial considerations. 5 4 Furthermore, the
Shaw II Court required that states must identify specific instances of past
discrimination and present a strong basis in evidence supporting the conclusion
that remedial action is necessary "before embark[ing] on an affirmative-action
program."55 Clearly the states are now faced with at least a more burdensome
evidentiary task.
Ill. SOUTH CAROLINA'S APPLICATION OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

On August 12, 1996 the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina considered, as a consolidated case, two challenges to the
constitutionality of certain South Carolina election districts.56 The district
court eventually held that race had been considered as the predominant factor
in drawing house districts 12, 54, 82, 91, 103, and 121 and senate districts 29,
34, and 37.57 Further, the court found that the districts were not narrowly
tailored to fulfill the state's asserted interest of complying with the Voting
Rights Act and, therefore, concluded that the districts violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.58
According to the court, the evidence of racial gerrymandering was
"overwhelming. " 9 Among the host of documents and facts cited, the
"bizarre shape" 6 of the districts and abnormal protrusions reaching out for
the sole purpose of encircling areas of minority voters, 61 Representative Don
Beatty's presentation of the redistricting plan in which he mentioned race as

469, 501 (1989)).
52. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
53. 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
54. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1951; Shaw I, 116 S. Ct. at 1901.
55. Shaw 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1902 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277
(1986)).
56. Smith v. Beasley, No. 3:95-3235-0, 1996 WL 673301 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 1996) (to be
reported at 946 F. Supp. 1174).
57. Id. at *42.
58. See id. at *43.
59. Id. at *38.
60. Id. at *38.
61. District 82 "snaked down into the City of Aiken to pick up black population." Id. at *26.
District 91 "is bizarre because of the hook around the white population in central Barnwell
County."Id. at *27. District 37 "meanders around the axis of U.S. Highway 17 (Alt.), stretching
...98 miles long." Id. at *35. District 34 "snakes along the northern half of South Carolina's
Atlantic shoreline," narrows to a width of less than a block, and extends about 90 miles. Id. at
*36.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss2/9

6

DeLuca: Where Should We Draw the Line?: South Carolina's Battle With Racial Gerrymandering
1997] SOUTH CAROLINA'S BATTLE WITH RACIAL GERRYMANDERING

421

the only factor for drawing the lines,62 "the lack of any analysis [of the
traditional redistricting principles] of compactness, communities of interest, or
contiguity,"' "the insistence on minimum racial percentages in certain
districts," s' and "the numerous calls and conferences with Department of
Justice attorneys"' weighed heavily.
The district court recognized the good faith of the state legislature in
drawing the districts to "what they thought was required by the law and by the
Department of Justice at the time."' The court noted, however, that good
faith is not enough to excuse the constitutional violation inherent in drawing
election districts according to race.67 In addition, the court was unwilling to
grant any special deference to the Justice Department's interpretation of the
Voting Rights Act. Miller v. Johnson" guided this latter decision. Indeed,
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Miller majority, flatly chastised the Justice
Department for "utilizing [section] 5 [of the Voting Rights Act] to require
States to create majority-minority districts wherever possible."69 Further,
Justice Kennedy described the Justice Department's interpretation as an
"expan[sion of] its authority under the statute beyond what Congress intended
and we have upheld. " 7°
The Beasley court, in an attempt to comply with Miller and other Supreme
Court precedent,7 ' ruled that any fashion of race-based districting must meet
the tests of strict scrutiny analysis. 2 Thus, the house and senate faced the
burden of producing evidence that race was not the predominant basis of their
districting schemes. But the plaintiffs maintained the ultimate burden of

62. Representative Beatty mentioned race twenty-four times in his short presentation. There
was no mention or consideration of any other factor in drawing the district lines. See id. at *18.
63. Id. at *38. The challenged house plan created 32 majority-minoriy districts, split 222
precincts, and split all but two counties. See id. at *9. The challenged senate plan created 12

majority-minority districts and divided 167*voting tabulation districts (VTDs). See id. at *33.
64. Id. at *38.
65. Id.
The Department of Justice's advocacy position is evidenced in many memoranda,
letters and notes of telephone conversations, but most particularly by the apparent
epidemic of amnesia that has dimmed the memory of many DOJ attorneys who were
involved with South Carolina's efforts to produce a reapportionment plan that would
pass preclearance
Id. at *18.
66. Id. at *39. The court even conceded that drawing voting districts may be the "most
difficult task a legislative body ever undertakes." Id.
67. See id.
68. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
69. Id. at 2493, quoted in Beasley, 1996 WL 673301, at *40.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1956 (1996); Shaw I, 116 S. Ct. at 1902;
Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488; Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 647.
72. See Beasley, 1996 WL 673301, at *41.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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persuading the court that the state did not in fact serve some alternative and
compelling interest or that the redistricting plan was not narrowly tailored to
further this interest. 3 The district court did recognize that remedying
specific past discrimination was a compelling state interest;74 however,
neither the house nor the senate could offer any evidence of their desire to
remedy past discrimination.75
The house and senate defended their plans by arguing that they had a
compelling state interest in obtaining preclearance under the Voting Rights
Act.76 In response, the Beasley court did not expressly decide whether
compliance with the Act was a compelling interest.' Instead, the court
assumed that intended compliance was compelling and focused on determining
whether the districting legislation was narrowly tailored to achieve that
objective.78
By implication, the district court suggested that the reapportionment plan
could have obtained preclearance if it (1) eliminated the bizarre configurations
of the districts, 79 (2) established no more majority-minority districts than
necessary to avoid retrogression," (3) did not create "super-safe" majorityminority districts with at least a fifty-five percent Black voting age population,81 and (4) adhered to traditional redistricting principles when drawing
district lines.n Neither the house nor senate plans could satisfy the strict
scrutiny test; therefore, the district court ruled the redistricting plan was
unconstitutional.8 3
Notwithstanding its finding of racial gerrymandering, the court allowed
the 1996 general elections to proceed as scheduled. The court recognized it
had a duty not to disrupt an election already in progress. 4 The court did

73. See id. at *39.
74. See id. at *40.
75. See id.
76. See id. at **40-41.
77. See id. The Beasley court also pointed out that the Shaw I and Miller decisions had
avoided to specifically hold that compliance with the Voting Rights Act was or was not a
compelling state interest. See id. at *40.
78. See id. at *41.
79. Districts are bizarre if they are not geographically compact and when minority pockets of
populations are brought in by using land bridges, tentacles, and appendages reaching out from
the core of the district. See id. at *38.
80. "A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding
retrogression if the state went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression." Id.
at *41 (quoting Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 655).
81. See id.
82. See id. at *42.
83. See id.
84. "[W]here an impending election is imminent and a State's election machinery is already
in progress, equitable considerations might justify a court in withholding the granting of
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enjoin the State, however, from conducting any subsequent elections using
these unconstitutional districts."
Furthermore, the court ordered that
legislators elected in the 1996 general election from these racially gerrymandered districts will only be able to serve for one year and that special elections
must be held in 1997 to elect representatives
and senators to serve the balance
86
of the terms in the amended districts.
The General Assembly will have until April 1, 19 9 7 8 to redraw these
election districts and have them precleared by the Department of Justice. 8
If the legislature fails to pass a constitutional redistricting plan, the court will
place its own remedial plan into effect.8 9
The district court followed Supreme Court precedent by allowing the state
to have the first opportunity to create a constitutional redistricting plan. In
Wise v. Lipscombl the Court recognized that "redistricting . . . legislative
bodies is a legislative task which the federal courts should make every effort
not to pre-empt."" The Court further noted that federal courts should give
the legislature a reasonable opportunity to develop a substitute measure
whenever practicable,' and only after allowing an adequate opportunity will
judicial relief be appropriate. 93
According to the South Carolina Constitution, 9' the General Assembly
has the responsibility, subject to the approval of the Governor, to redistrict the
South Carolina Senate and House of Representatives. 95 The General
Assembly can, of course, override a Governor's veto by a two-thirds vote of

immediately effective relief in a legislative apportionment case, even though the existing
apportionment scheme was found invalid." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964), quoted
inBeasley, 1996 WL 673301, at *43. The district court decided not to change the districting plan
for the 1996 elections because the election was only six weeks away, the primary elections had
already been held, the candidates had spent significant time and money campaigning, and the
delay would cause significant confusion for the voters. See Beasley, 1996 WL 673301, at *44.
85. See id. at *45.
86. See id. Individuals in the infirm districts "are entitled to have their rights vindicated as
soon as possible so that they can vote for their representatives under a constitutional apportionment plan." Id. (citing Cosner v. Dalton, 522 F. Supp. 350, 364 (E.D. Va. 1981)).
87. See id. at *45.
88. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires a state to obtain approval from the Attorney
General before enacting the districting plan. The purpose of the section 5 review "does not
require maximization; it is intended to prevent retrogression." ld. at *41.
89. See id.
90. 437 U.S. 535 (1978).
91. Id. at 539.
92. See id.at 540.
93. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964).
94. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 3.
95. See Beasley, 1996 WL 673301, at *2.
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both the senate and the house.96 "Only when a legislature fails to redistrict
according to the federal Constitution and applicable federal statutes in a timely
fashion does judicial relief become appropriate."'
Although the Miller Court emphasized its hesitancy in reviewing
redistricting legislation, 98 it, nevertheless, reviewed the legislative decision.
Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority's holding because it expanded the
judiciary's role in the redistricting process.' Justice Ginsburg argued that
the principles of federalism and separation of powers justify giving deference
to state legislatures' redistricting plans."t° Relying on Supreme Court
precedent, Ginsburg stated that "reapportionment is primarily the duty and
responsibility of the State through its legislature ... ,rather than of a federal
court. "101
IV. CONCLUSION

Judicial interference with legislative redistricting plans creates serious
separation of powers concerns. At its base, it means unelected officials will
decide issues that should be decided only by a representative body. 1 2
Before Congress passed the Voting Rights Act, some judicial intervention was
admittedly necessary in voting rights cases to protect important constitutional
rights. Since passing the Act, however, Congress has ensured that state
legislatures recognize minority voting rights through such safeguards as
requiring preclearance from Department of Justice officials, who set uniform
guidelines for the states to follow. 3 Today's courts should, therefore,
consider, at great length, the propriety of judicial intervention before taking
over the job of legislators.
Repairing the faulty, gerrymandered districts is exactly the job the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina may yet be required to
do. That is, the South Carolina Senate and House of Representatives may not
be able to approve new plans and obtain preclearance from the Department of
96. See S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21.
97. Beasley, 1996 WL 673301, at *2 (citing White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783,794-95 (1973)).
98. "Electoral districting is a most difficult subject for legislatures, and so the States must
have discretion to exercise the political judgment necessary to balance competing interests."
Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488.
99. See id. at 2499 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
100. See Latimer, supra note 41, at 134 (citing Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2500 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting)).
101. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2500 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420
U.S. 1, 27 (1975)).
102. See Latimer, supranote 41, at 143. "Fixing gerrymandering would only bring worse evils
.... such as requiring judges to perform a crucial regulatory function at the heart of the political
process." Polsby & Popper, supra note 10, at 316.
103. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
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Justice before April 1, 1997. It is unlikely that incumbent senators and
representatives will approve a plan that alters their districts and requires them
to run again in November 1997. °4
The South Carolina General Assembly is clearly in a difficult situation.
Without restraint, legislators will be tempted to draw district lines to favor the
political party in power, and without preclearance, the courts will be forced
to interfere with a function given exclusively to the legislatures by the South
Carolina Constitution.
A better solution may be to form a commission consisting of nonpoliticians appointed by the legislature to propose new election districts that
adhere to the traditional districting principles of compactness, contiguity, and
respect for political subdivisions. The legislature would likely be able to
obtain preclearance from the Department of Justice for such a non-partisan
redistricting plan. At the same time, the legislature would maintain a
satisfying modicum of control over the reapportionment process. In any event
the legislative and judicial branches must reach a compromise; without
compromise, the dance is sure to begin again. The only question is whether
the next challenge will be based on equal protection or separation of powers.
Michelle DeLuca

104. As of January 31, 1997, the South Carolina Senate attached its reapportionment plan to
the House plan, H. 3002. The Senate passed H. 3002 with amendments and returned it to the
House for approval.
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